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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jayson L. Woods appeals from his judgment of conviction, asserting that the district court
violated his Confrontation Clause rights by permitting a data acquisition and recovery technician
to testify via Skype video conferencing, and that the district court committed fundamental error,
violating his right to be free from double jeopardy, by failing to merge his conspiracy charge
with the robbery, and thus, the murder, charges.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the early morning hours of April 29, 2016, several Canyon County residents were
awakened by a man ringing their doorbell and asking for help.  (Tr., p.835, L.4 – p.836, L.8;
p.861, Ls.18-22.)  Christopher Odenberg with the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office responded and
found this individual, who was identified as Steven Nelson.  (Tr., p.845, Ls.15-21.)
Mr. Nelson told Deputy Odenberg that he had responded to a Backpage.com
advertisement for a male escort for sex, and that he picked up a man at a Walmart store and they
had driven out to Gott’s Point.  (Tr., p.846, L.12-16.)   Mr. Nelson stated that the other man had
asked if he had the money, and once Mr. Nelson showed him the money, the man attacked
Mr. Nelson by choking and kicking him, before stealing his clothes, phone, and car keys.
(Tr., p.846, Ls.11-25.)  Mr. Nelson told Deputy Odenberg that he was injured, and that he
believed he was dying due to having Hepatitis C and cirrhosis of the liver.  (Tr., p.847, L.20 –
p.848, L.10.)  Mr. Nelson was eventually transported to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
in Boise, where he died from cardiac arrest.  (Tr. p.919, Ls.10-17.)
The  Canyon  County  Sheriff’s  Office  was  then  contacted  by  Abigail  Williams,  who
agreed to speak with investigators.  (Tr., p.1537, Ls.9-16.)  She testified that she and Mr. Woods,
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her ex-boyfriend, had a business relationship where she would have sex with men for money and
she would turn the money over to Mr. Woods.  (Tr., p.1481, L.20 – p.1483, L.3.)
Advertisements would be placed online, and Mr. Woods would set everything up while she
would perform the sexual acts.  (Tr., p.1483, L.24 – p.1484, L.3.)
Ms. Williams testified that on the evening at issue, she was driving around with
Mr. Woods, Kelly Schneider, Kevin Tracy, and Daniel Henkel, and that “we had put up ads for
all the men as well as had an ad for myself …”  (Tr., p.1500, Ls.19-25.)  Mr. Nelson responded
to one of Kelly Schneider’s advertisements.  (Tr., p.1506, Ls.13-16; p.1510, Ls.17-18.)
Mr. Woods testified that he told Mr. Schneider to agree to the transaction, but that “if you can’t
go through with it, just take the money and go.”  (Tr., p.1729, Ls. 2-3.)  Mr. Schneider took
Mr. Nelson’s money at this exchange and then ran.  (Tr., p.1729, Ls.18-21.)  Mr. Woods
explained that this was a “grab and go”:
A grab and go is where you meet up with somebody and you can’t – you decide
not to do the service, not to provide the service, and you already have your money
up front.  They already give you the money.  So you decide to just make an
excuse and walk away.
The purpose of a grab and go was mainly for the comfort of the escort.  Like if the
person  wasn’t  hygienically  clean  or  they  were  mistreating  the  escort  or,  for
example, the escort just didn’t get a good vibe and wasn’t comfortable, they just
walk away.
(Tr., p.1707, Ls.3-17.)   He testified that a “grab and go” would happen about ten percent of the
time.  (Tr., p.1707, Ls.23-24.)  Mr. Woods stated that they would not do “grab and go’s” very
often because “we had a reputation.  I was- I was working to build a legal escort service, and we
were  trying  to  establish  a  positive  reputation  …”   (Tr.,  p.1708,  Ls.3-8.)   For  this  reason,
Mr. Woods testified that hurting clients was a “no go.  That’s not okay for business at all.”
(Tr., p.1708, Ls.23-25.)
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Later that evening, Mr. Nelson sent another message to the advertisement and stated that
he was willing to meet again if Mr. Schneider agreed to perform the sexual act.  (Tr., p.1730,
Ls.3-9.)  In regard to the second encounter with Mr. Nelson, Mr. Woods testified:  “we were,
because we didn’t know – we had never done a grab and go on the same person twice.  So we
didn’t know if Steven Nelson was going to, you know, have a gun and try to get retribution or if
was a setup to try to snake Kelly because Steven Nelson had said he wanted Kelly to come to his
house.”  (Tr., p.1748, Ls.17-23.)  Mr. Woods emphasized that “attacking Mr. Nelson was never
even discussed.”  (Tr., p.1749, Ls.12-15.)  Mr. Woods did suggest that Mr. Tracy and
Mr.  Henkel  be  at  the  scene  “just  in  case  Steven  Nelson  tried  to  pull  something  on  Kelly.”
(Tr., p.1750, Ls.17-25.)
On the other hand, Ms. Williams testified that the plan was that “they would come into
the area, and the guys would be hiding, being Kelly [sic] and Daniel would be hiding nearby, and
they would ambush them and rob them.”  (Tr., p.1501, Ls.19-24.)  Ms. Williams testified that
this was Mr. Woods’s idea.  (Tr., p.1501, Ls.24-25.)  Thus, according to the State, Mr. Woods
and the others planned for Mr. Schneider to meet up with Mr. Nelson again and “take him for a
larger amount of money.”  (Tr., p.1511, L.22 – p.1512, L.1.)  Mr. Woods dropped off Kevin
Tracy and Daniel Henkel at Gott’s Point in order to assist Mr. Schneider if need be.  (Tr. p.1513,
Ls.9-14.)  Mr. Henkel carried a baton.  (Tr., p.1514, Ls.13-25.)  Mr. Woods then dropped off
Mr. Schneider at the Walmart in order to meet with Mr. Nelson.  (Tr., p.1516, Ls.13-20.)  Once
they arrived at Gott’s Point, Mr. Schneider attacked Mr. Nelson and Mr. Nelson died as a result
of that attack.  (Tr. p.846, Ls.11-25, p.919, Ls.10-17.)
Mr. Woods was charged with first degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit
robbery, and accepting the earnings of a prostitute.  (R., p.32.)  The State alleged that Mr. Woods
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aided and abetted Kelly Schneider’s robbery of Mr. Nelson during which Mr. Schneider killed
Mr.  Nelson.   (R.,  p.32.)   Thus,  the  State  proceeded  on  the  theory  of  felony  murder.   At  trial,
Mr. Woods admitted that he was guilty of accepting the earnings of a prostitute.  (Tr., p.1702,
Ls.15-20.)  However, Mr. Woods adamantly denied that he intended that Mr. Schneider or
anyone else rob Mr. Nelson.
At trial, the State introduced data obtained from the cellular phones of the participants of
the  evening’s  events,  but  the  State  had  difficulty  extracting  data  from  one  of  Mr.  Woods’s
phones.  The State sent this phone to Virginia to be analyzed eight months before trial, and
requested that the data technician, Steve Barrios, be allowed to testify via Skype. (Tr., p.1421,
Ls.3-6.)  Over defense counsel’s Confrontation Clause objection, the court permitted the video
testimony.  (Tr., p.1424, Ls.6-18.)  Once the foundation was laid for how the data was obtained,
the State introduced evidence of the text messages found on the phone.  (Tr., p.1434, Ls.11-18;
State’s Ex. 200; 201; 215; 206A.)
Mr. Woods was found guilty following trial and the district court imposed sentences of
life, with twenty-three years fixed for murder, life, with ten years fixed, for conspiracy to commit
robbery, and fifteen years, with five years fixed, for accepting the earnings of a prostitute.
(R., p.585.)  The court merged the robbery charge with the murder charge.  (R., p.585.)
Mr. Woods appealed.  (R., p.588.)
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ISSUES
I. Whether the district court erred by permitting Steve Barrios to testify via Skype?
II. Whether the district court committed fundamental error by imposing sentences for both
the conspiracy charge and the felony murder charge in violation of Mr. Woods’s right to




The District Court Erred By Permitting Steve Barrios To Testify Via Skype
A. Introduction
Mr. Woods submits that district court erred by permitting Steve Barrios to testify via
Skype because the State failed to establish an important public policy necessary to excuse
traditional in-court testimony.
B. Standard Of Review
Constitutional issues are questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.
State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849, 851 (2012).  Further, the harmless error test articulated in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), applies in cases of objected-to error. See State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010). Under the Chapman harmless error analysis, where a
constitutional violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, a
reversal is necessitated, unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id.
C. The District Court Erred By Permitting Steve Barrios To Testify Via Skype
The district court noted that it had been advised in chambers that the State was seeking to
have Steve Barrios testify through Skype rather than having him “be forced to come and testify,
because availability may not be there.”  (Tr., p.1420, Ls.14-23.)  Mr. Barrios was a data
acquisition and recovery technician at Booz Alan Hamilton in Quantico, Virginia, who examined
a cellular phone obtained from Mr. Woods.  (Tr., p.1427, L.5 – p.1428, L.20.)  The State
requested that Mr. Barrios’s presence at the trial be excused because, “the data recovery was just
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sent back to us this week.  We just recently in the last day have been able to provide a copy to
Mr. Sisson as defense counsel.”  (Tr., p.1421, Ls.3-6.)  The State then asserted that defense
counsel waived any right to object because he previously did not agree to a continuance.1
(Tr., p.1421.)  Counsel for Mr. Woods acknowledged that he did not agree to a continuance, but
noted that the State “had this phone for nine months, and apparently it only became a priority for
them to get the data from it fairly late into the game.”  (Tr., p.1421.)
Counsel for Mr. Woods objected on the basis of the Confrontation Clause:
Well, Your Honor, obviously my client has a Sixth Amendment right to confront
any witness that’s against him.  Generally speaking, the courts in the past have
preferred that in many cases, not only on the State but the federal level, that the
preference is to have witnesses in court so that they can be observed not only by
the  defendant  and  his  attorney  but  also  the  jury.   And  so  although  it  might  be  a
slight hardship for the State in arranging this person to fly out here for the
testimony, it’s not an insurmountable barrier.  We can get him plane tickets.  We
can  get  him  out  here.   Money,  although  once  again  everyone’s  concerned  about
money, but it’s not something that is going to bankrupt the county.  And so my
client and I would strongly urge the Court to require this technical person to be
here so we can cross-examine them and confront them.
(Tr., p.1422, Ls.3-22.)  The State then acknowledged, “the case law does state the preference is
for  the  [C]onfrontation  [C]lause  that  it  be  in  person  face  to  face.”   (Tr.,  p.1422,  Ls.22-25.)
However, the State then argued,
This witness is purely foundation.  And the State did do its due diligence in
attempting to get this data as fast as it possibly could.  We sent the phones off in
May.  It’s been as the – as [a prior witness] testified, it had to be first processed
here, then sent off to another agency in Nebraska, and then finally ended up in
Quantico.  So we did our due diligence into attempting to get this information as
fast as we possibly could.
(Tr., p.1423, Ls.2-11.)
1 With regard to the continuance, the district court held, “I do not believe and I do not conclude
that you waived any right to your objection because you didn’t agree to a continuance.”
(Tr., p.1421, Ls.23-25.)
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The district court noted that, while Idaho cases had addressed the propriety of special
procedures with regard to child witnesses in sex offense cases, “it has not addressed the situation
in this case.”  (Tr., p.1423, Ls.12-22.)  The district court noted that some jurisdictions permitted
this procedure for “minor things such as chain of custody” and then ruled,
I have considered the costs and the time limits of flying somebody from Quantico,
Virginia here to Idaho just to identify the process of getting to the phone that they
were able to do it and sent a package of results, although not totally printed out,
back to Idaho where those results were printed out in a usable form by the witness
that has testified.  I think that those are considerations that have been allowed in
other cases.
I will allow for foundation purposes only the Quantico witness to be questioned
and cross-examined through Skype only.  But it will be for foundation purposes
only.
(Tr.,  p.1424,  Ls.6-18.)   Mr.  Barrios  then  testified  that  he  received  a  cellular  phone  from  Don
Lukasik at RCFL a data recovery lab in Boise, recovered the data from the phone, and sent the
copy of the data back to Mr. Lukasik at RCFL.  (Tr., p.1428, L.15 – p.1430, L.6.)  Mr. Woods
submits that the district court erred by permitting Mr. Barrios to testify via Skype, because cost
and convenience do not excuse the Confrontation Clause’s general requirement that witnesses be
present for face-to-face testimony.
“The  Sixth  Amendment’s  Confrontation  Clause  provides  that,  ‘[i]n  all  criminal
prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  .  .  .  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against
him.’” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (alternation in original) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. VI). “The Confrontation Clause ‘is made obligatory on the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment.’” State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 528 (2014) (quoting Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)).
Confrontation:  (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath—
thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the
lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to
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cross-examination,  “the  greatest  legal  engine  ever  invented  for  the  discovery  of
truth”; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe
the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in
assessing his credibility.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE § 1367 (3d ed.
1940)).
The United States Supreme Court addressed the use of video testimony in Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).  In Craig, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a procedure
permitted by a Maryland statute that allowed a child victim to testify via a one-way closed circuit
television instead of appearing in court.  This mechanism allowed those in the courtroom to
observe  the  child  as  he  or  she  testified  and  was  cross-examined  in  a  separate  room;  the  child,
however, could not see the defendant. Id. at 841.  The defendant was still able to communicate
with his defense counsel during cross-examination. Id. at 842.  After reviewing the history and
purpose of the Confrontation Clause, the Court held that “a defendant's right to confront
accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only
where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.” Id. at 850.  (emphasis added).
The Court concluded that the testimony provided via the one-way circuit television was
reliable, because it afforded elements of confrontation—oath, cross-examination, and
observation of the witness’s demeanor—that “adequately ensure[d] that the testimony is both
reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that
accorded live, in-person testimony.” Id. at 851.  Next, the Court held that “if the State makes an
adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of
testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure
that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of
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face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.” Id. at 855. The Court explained that the “requisite
finding of necessity must ... be a case-specific one: The trial court must hear evidence and
determine whether use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect
the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify[,]” such that the child would be
traumatized  by  the  presence  of  the  defendant  and  that  the  emotional  distress  to  be  suffered  is
more than de minimus. Id. at 855-56.
While Craig addresses the use of one-way video testimony, Mr. Woods submits that the
standard announced in Craig must apply to two-way video testimony as well.  Courts in other
jurisdictions agree:  “We deem two-way video testimony, although it provides some additional
confrontation assurances than one-way video testimony does, nevertheless to fall short of
providing the same guarantees as physical, in-court testimony.” White v. State, 116 A.3d 520,
544 (Ct. App. Md. 2015).  “Even the most cutting-edge technology cannot wholly replace the
weight of in-court testimony, for the electronic delivery of that testimony—no matter how
clearly depicted and crisply heard—is isolated from the solemn atmosphere of the courtroom and
compromises human connection to emotions like fear, apprehension, or confusion.” Id.
Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland concluded,
the Craig standard applies when the State seeks to present witness testimony via
two-way video conference against a defendant in a criminal proceeding. And, the
issues this Court must resolve pursuant to the standard set forth in Craig are
whether … testimony via a two-way medium was reliable; whether the denial of
[the defendant’s] right to confront [the witness] in person furthered an important
public policy; and whether the court made a sufficient finding of necessity.
Id.  Mr. Woods submits that in this case, the State failed to demonstrate that denial of face-to-
face confrontation furthered an important public policy and that testimony via Skype was a
necessity.  In White, the court noted that the defendant argued that, “convenience and efficiency
are not sufficiently important public policies to warrant dispensing the right to physical face-to-
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face confrontation, and we agree.” Id. at 545. White relied on United State v. Yates, 438 F.3d
1307 (11th Cir. 2006).  In Yates, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, where the State sought video
testimony from a witness that was overseas,
The district court made no case-specific findings of fact that would support a
conclusion that this case is different from any other criminal prosecution in which
the Government would find it convenient to present testimony by two-way video
conference. All criminal prosecutions include at least some evidence crucial to the
Government’s case, and there is no doubt that many criminal cases could be more
expeditiously resolved were it unnecessary for witnesses to appear at trial. If we
were to approve introduction of testimony in this manner, on this record, every
prosecutor wishing to present testimony from a witness overseas would argue that
providing crucial prosecution evidence and resolving the case expeditiously are
important public policies that support the admission of testimony by two-way
video conference.
Id. at 1316.
This Court should agree with the courts in White and Yates and hold that the State’s
concerns about convenience and efficiency are not important public policies that support the
admission of testimony by two-way video conference.  First, the State presented no evidence, or
even argument, as to what it would cost to fly Mr. Barrios to Idaho for trial in this case.  Second,
the State presented no evidence, or even argument, as to the efforts that it had made to secure
Mr.  Barrios’s  presence.   The  State  represented  to  the  court  that  it  had  “sent  the  phones  off  in
May,” and the trial in this case was held in late January of the following year.  (Tr., p.1423, Ls.2-
11.)  The State thus knew that this witness’s testimony might be necessary for months.  Finally,
though the State asserted that Mr. Barrios’s “availability” was at issue, (Tr., p.1420, Ls.21-24),
Mr. Barrios was clearly not “unavailable” pursuant to the Rules of Evidence. See I.R.E. 804(a).
However, even if the State had presented evidence or argument as to what the costs might be to
secure Mr. Barrios’s presence, concerns about expediency and convenience are insufficient
policy considerations and do not excuse face-to-face confrontation.
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Finally, Mr. Woods notes that, though not cited or discussed in the district court in this
case, Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 provides:
Forensic testimony may be offered by video teleconference. For testimony by
video teleconference to be admissible:
(a) Witness Visible to Participants. The forensic scientist must be visible to the
court, defendant, counsel, jury, and others physically present in the courtroom.
(1) The  court  and  the  forensic  scientist  must  be  able  to  see  and  hear  each  other
simultaneously and communicate with each other during the proceeding.
(2) The defendant, counsel from both sides, and the forensic scientist must be able
to see and hear each other simultaneously and communicate with each other
during the proceeding.
(3) A defendant who is represented by counsel must be able to consult privately
with defense counsel during the proceeding.
(b) Written Notice Required. The party intending to submit testimony by video
teleconference must give written notice to the court and opposing party 28
days before the proceeding date.
(c) Written Notice of Objection or Affirmative Consent. A party opposing the
giving of testimony by video teleconference must give the court and opposing
party written notification of objection or affirmative consent at  least  14 days
before the proceeding date.
(d) Party Responsible for Coordinating. The party seeking to introduce
testimony by video teleconference is responsible for coordinating the
audiovisual feed into the courtroom. Nothing in this rule requires court
personnel to assist in the preparation or presentation of the testimony provided
by the provisions of this rule.
The testimony must be recorded in the same manner as any other testimony in the
proceeding.
I.C.R. 43.2.  This Rule does not define “forensic evidence,” but to the extent that it could
potentially allow for video testimony in cases such as these without requiring the State
demonstrate that denial of face-to-face confrontation is necessary to further an important public
policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured, the Rule is
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unconstitutional in light of Craig.  Further, although Mr. Woods did not object on this basis,
Mr. Woods notes that the State did not comply with the written notice requirement of the Rule.
(See generally, R.)
In  sum,  the  State’s  concerns  about  cost  and  convenience  do  not  override  Mr.  Woods’s
right to confront witnesses in court.  The district court therefore erred by permitting Mr. Barrios
to testify via Skype.
II.
The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Imposing Sentences For Both The
Conspiracy Charge And The Felony Murder Charge In Violation Of Mr. Woods’s Right To Be
Free From Double Jeopardy
A. Introduction
While the district court recognized that Idaho law required Mr. Woods’s robbery
conviction to merge with his felony murder conviction, it failed to recognize that those offenses
also merged with the conspiracy conviction due to the Idaho Constitution’s protection against
double jeopardy.  The violation of that right is shown through Idaho’s pleading theory, which
reveals the acts by which Mr. Woods was alleged to have furthered the conspiracy were the
means or method by which he aided and abetted the robbery, and thus, the murder.  That is
because the acts Mr. Woods was charged to have committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
were the same acts by which he was alleged to have aided and abetted the robbery.
The  district  court’s  error  in  imposing  two  sentences  for  the  same  conduct  constitutes
fundamental error because it affects one of Mr. Woods’s unwaived constitutional rights, is clear
from the record, and is prejudicial to Mr. Woods. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010);
State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 657-58 (Ct. App. 2014) (explaining that a defendant may raise
claims regarding double jeopardy violations as fundamental error.)
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B. The Dual Convictions Violated Mr. Woods’s Idaho Constitutional Right To Be Free
From Double Jeopardy
One of the protections afforded by the right to be free from double jeopardy is the
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Moad, 156 Idaho 658.  This
protection “is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple
expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.” State v. Moffat,
154 Idaho 529, 534 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169-70 (1977)).
Rather, “when a person commits multiple acts against the same victim during a single criminal
episode and each act could independently support a conviction for the same offense, for purposes
of double jeopardy the ‘offense’ is typically the episode, not the individual act.” Id.
To determine whether such a course of conduct constitutes “the same offense” under its
state constitution, Idaho uses the pleading theory. See, e.g., State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, 87
(2016) (applying the pleading theory to a claim of double jeopardy raised solely under the Idaho
Constitution).  That theory looks at the language of the charging document to evaluate whether
one of the offenses is alleged “as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense.”
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013); State v. Weatherly, 160 Idaho 302, 305 (Ct. App.
2016).  Because of this focus on the charging language, the pleading theory offers more
protections than its federal counterpart. McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841; Weatherly, 160 Idaho at
305.
Recognizing that Idaho has traditionally afforded more protections against double
jeopardy, both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have both held that conspiracy
and the substantive offense constitute “the same offense” in Idaho when all the acts the
defendant is alleged to have committed in furtherance of the conspiracy are the same acts by
which he is alleged to have aided and abetted the substantive offense. State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho
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1097, 1101 (1987); State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 567-68 (Ct. App. 1984) (acknowledging the
contrary federal rule that “a conviction and sentence on a count charging conspiracy will not, on
a theory of double punishment, prevent conviction and sentence on another count charging the
substantive offense”).
In Sterley, for example, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled
substance as well as aiding and abetting delivery of a controlled substance. Sterley, 112 Idaho at
1098.   “The  Information,  charging  Sterley,  listed  delivery  as  one  of  the  elements  of  the
conspiracy.” Id.  As a result, “everything Sterley did to aid and abet the delivery of cocaine was
also done in furtherance of the conspiracy,” and so, the Supreme Court held that “the delivery is
totally subsumed in the conspiracy conviction.” Id.  In other words, the charged conduct could
not be divided into separate temporal units, and so, the two convictions were for “the same
offense,” which meant they violated Idaho’s protections against double jeopardy, and one had to
be vacated. Id.; but see State v. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 648 (2014) (holding that, based
on the language of the charging document in that case, the substantive offense was not charged
as  an  element  of  the  conspiracy,  but  only  as  the  goal  of  the  conspiracy,  and  so,  the  two
convictions were not for the same offense).
Likewise, the Gallatin Court looked at the acts alleged in the charging document, and
concluded  “everything  Gallatin  did  to  aid  and  abet  the  delivery  of  the  cocaine,  he  did  also  in
furtherance of the conspiracy.  His conduct was one continuous ‘act.’  He did nothing more as a
principle by aiding and abetting the delivery of the cocaine than he did in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 569.  As a result, the Court of Appeals held the defendant in
that case could only be convicted of the conspiracy charge and the additional conviction for the
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subsumed substantive offense had to be vacated in the face of Idaho’s protections against double
jeopardy. Id.
While the analysis in both Sterley and Gallatin is similar to that required by the pleading
theory, they were both actually analyzing the double jeopardy question under I.C. § 18-301,
which has since been repealed. See Sterley, 106 Idaho at 569 (acknowledging the difference
between the protections in I.C. § 18-301 and the protections under the Idaho Constitution).
However, because the pleading theory survived the repeal of I.C. § 18-301, see Sepulveda, 161
Idaho at 87, Sterley and Gallatin remain useful in understanding how Idaho has traditionally
understood its protections against double jeopardy in cases involving charges for both the
conspiracy and the associated substantive offense.  Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court explained
in Sanchez-Castro, the question of whether such charges merge under Idaho’s constitutional
protection against double jeopardy remains one of first impression.2 Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho
at 648.
Applying  the  pleading  theory  in  this  case  reveals  the  answer  to  that  question  is  the
affirmative – the two offenses merge due to the Idaho Constitution’s protections.  Specifically,
the Indictment alleged Mr. Woods acted in furtherance of the conspiracy by:
1.  On or about April 29th 2016, Jayson Woods drove Kelly Schneider or Daniel
Henkel in a Chevy HHR to meet Steven Nelson at a Walmart in Nampa, Idaho.
2.  On or about April 29th 2016, Jayson Woods drove Daniel Henkel and Kevin
Tracy in a Chevy HHR to Gott’s Point to wait for Kelly Schneider to rob Steven
Nelson at that location.
2 The Supreme Court did not answer that question in Sanchez-Castro, likely due the fact that the
appellant in that case had not presented argument or authority in regard to the pleading theory
analysis. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 649; see State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 795 (1997)
(explaining the Court does not address issues not supported by argument or authority); see also
State v. Barton, 154 Idaho 289, 294 (2013) (Horton, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court
should not address issues such as the continuing viability of precedent with a constitutional
foothold without first receiving “input from interested parties”).
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. . .
5.  On or about April 29th 2016, Jayson Woods returned with Kelly Schneider to a
Walmart in Nampa Idaho to meet with Steven Nelson.
. . .
12.  On or about April 29th 2016, Kelly Schneider gave Jayson Woods forty
dollars from the proceeds of the robbery.
(R.,  p.34  (the  omitted  charged  acts  only  refer  to  the  actions  of  the  other  conspirators,  not
Mr. Woods).)  Likewise, the Indictment alleged Mr. Woods aided and abetted the robbery by:
Jayson L. Woods, on or about the 29th day of April, 2016, . . . did aid, abet, assist,
facilitate and/or encourage Kelley Schneider to feloniously, intentionally and by
means of force or fear take from the person and/or immediate presence of Steven
Nelson certain property . . . .
(R., p.33.)  Thus, Mr. Woods was alleged to have furthered conspiracy by facilitating Kelly
Schneider’s ability to forcibly take property from Mr. Nelson by driving him to meet Mr. Nelson
and driving the backup to Gott’s Point.  Like the defendants in Sterley and Gallatin, everything
Mr. Woods was alleged to have done to aid and abet the robbery of Mr. Nelson, he had also done
in  furtherance  of  the  conspiracy  to  rob  Mr.  Nelson.   As  a  result,  his  participation  in  the
conspiracy was the means or method by which he aided and abetted the robbery, and thus, the
murder.  Therefore, separate convictions for the conspiracy and the substantive offense are
impermissible under the Idaho Constitution’s protections against double jeopardy and the two
offenses should have merged.
That conclusion becomes even more apparent by looking at the contrasting situation
presented in State v. Sensenig, 110 Idaho 83 (Ct. App. 1985) (also evaluating the double
jeopardy question under I.C. § 18-301).  In that case, the defendant and his co-conspirators
agreed to commit a series of robberies at various stores across Idaho and Utah. Id. at 85.  The
Sensenig Court determined that, while the allegations regarding the conspiracy and the
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substantive offense overlapped, there were temporal and spatial distinctions between the acts
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and the acts committed in aiding and abetting one of
the particular robberies. See id.; but see Moad, 156 Idaho 654 (upholding separate convictions
for acts occurring during a single course of conduct because those acts occurred at different
times in different areas of the defendant’s prison cell).  Because it found distinct acts, the
Sensenig Court held the conspiracy conviction did not merge with the conviction for aiding and
abetting of one of the planned robberies.3 Sensenig, 110 Idaho at 85.
Unlike Sensenig, the conspiracy and the robbery charges in the Indictment in
Mr.  Woods’s  case  both  refer  only  to  Mr.  Woods’s  actions  in  the  car  on  the  night  of  April  29,
2016, which were directed against Mr. Nelson.  (R., pp.33-34.)  Therefore, there is no temporal
or spatial distinction between the alleged conspiratorial conduct and the alleged abetting conduct
in this case.  Rather, under the pleading theory, the conspiracy and substantive offense charges in
3 This conclusion in Sensenig appears to be at odds with the Court of Appeals’ prior decision in
Gallatin.  Though Sensenig did not recite the language of the charging document, its description
of  the  conspiracy  suggests  that  charge  included  the  acts  for  aiding  the  specific  robbery  in
question as well as acts relating to the other, uncharged robberies. Sensenig, 110 Idaho 53-54.
However, just because the conspiracy was broader than the specific robbery does not mean that
everything done to aid and abet the robbery was not also done in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Because that was still the case, Gallatin still would have required the substantive charge to be
vacated due to Idaho’s protections against double jeopardy. Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 569; but see
Sensenig, 110 Idaho at 54.
That conflict is ultimately unimportant, however, because the issue was resolved by the
Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Sterley two years later.  The Sterley Court adopted Gallatin’s
approach, thereby effectively overruling the contrary approach in Sensenig. Sterley, 112 Idaho at
1098 (holding that one of the two convictions had to be vacated because “the delivery is totally
subsumed in the conspiracy conviction” since “everything Sterley did to aid and abet the delivery
of cocaine was also done in furtherance of the conspiracy”); cf. State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271,
272 n.1 (2013) (explaining the Supreme Court does not search for conflicting decisions from the
Court of Appeals when it decides a point of law; it simply announces the law going forward).
The same is true in Mr. Woods’s case – if the conspiracy charge were broader than just the
robbery of Mr. Nelson, all Mr. Woods’s acts aiding and abetting the robbery of Mr. Nelson were
still  done  in  furtherance  of  the  broader  conspiracy  charge,  and  so,  still  charged  “the  same
offense” under Idaho’s pleading theory.
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Mr. Woods’s case were for the same course of conduct, and thus, “the same offense.”  As a
result, the dual punishments violate the Idaho Constitution’s protections against the double
jeopardy.  There is no evidence in the record to suggest Mr. Woods waived his right to be free
from double jeopardy.  (See generally R.)   Therefore,  the  first  prong  of  the Perry analysis is
satisfied in this case.
C. The Error Is Clear From The Face Of The Record
As discussed in Section II (B), supra, the Indictment in this case makes it clear which
acts Mr. Woods was charged with committing in furtherance of the conspiracy and that those are
the same acts by which he allegedly aided and abetted the robbery, and thus, the murder.
(R., pp.33-34.)  The Judgment of Conviction reveals that convictions were entered and sentences
were imposed for both the conspiracy and the murder charges.  (R., pp.585-87.)  Therefore, the
double punishment for the same charged acts is clear from the face of the record, and thus, the
second prong of the Perry analysis is met in this case.
D. The Error Prejudiced Mr. Woods
The  prejudice  in  this  case,  the  effect  of  the  district  court’s  error  on  the  outcome of  the
proceedings, is obvious from the fact that Mr. Woods has two convictions, and so, is serving
two sentences for his single charged course of conduct in this case instead of one.  (See
R., pp.585-87.)  Therefore, the third prong of Perry is met in this case.
E. Remedy
Because all three prongs of the Perry standard  are  satisfied  by  the  district  court’s
imposition of the two sentences in Mr. Woods’s case, this Court should grant relief for that
fundamental error. Sterley and Gallatin provide guidance as to the proper relief for this error.  In
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Sterley, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the district court to vacate one of the two
convictions and sentences, though it noted the substantive offense was the one subsumed.
Sterley, 112 Idaho at 1098.  In fact, under Gallatin, the district court in Sterley was obligated to
vacate the conviction for the substantive offense. Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 570 (holding the
conviction for the conspiracy was the one which properly survived because the defendant’s
actions  were  more  properly  addressed  under  the  law  against  conspiracy).   For  those  same
reasons, this Court should remand this case with instructions to simply vacate Mr. Woods’s
conviction and sentence on the murder charge.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Woods requests that his convictions be vacated and his case remanded for further
proceedings.  Alternatively, he requests that this Court remand this case with instructions to
simply vacate Mr. Woods’s conviction and sentence on the murder charge.
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